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1. Introduction 
 
A franchise is a vertical relationship between a franchisor and many franchisees. 
Combs, e.a. (2004, P907) define that “In franchising, one firm (the franchisor) sells the 
right to market goods or services under its brand name and using its business practices to 
a second firm (the franchisee)”. Franchising is an important phenomenon. In 1998, there 
were nearly $850 billion in sales of franchised goods and services at over 700,000 US 
franchise locations. And in the year 2000, franchises made up an estimated $1 trillion in 
annual retail sales (Franchise Funding, 2004). According to Michael (1996), sales 
through franchise have accounted for a significant portion in the following industries: 
printing and copying (71% of sales), tax preparation (67%), specialty food retailing 
(55%), restaurants (46%). 
Various aspects of franchising are not well understood. Hendrikse and 
Windsperger (2004) identify topics like governance of franchises (bottom-up franchises, 
plural form), Gibrat’s law, cognition, and complementarity. This article will focus on 
plural form franchising. It entails that some outlets are owned by franchisor, while other 
stores are owned by franchisees. Standard economic theory predicts the convergence of 
governance structures over time, i.e. the selection process of the market winnows out the 
efficient governance structure. Accordingly, some authors (e.g. Gallini and Lutz 1992; 
Scott, 1995; Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969; Caves and Murphy 1976; Norton, 1988) argue 
that the dual ownership structure is a transitory phenomenon. They predict that in the 
long run, one organizational structure, either wholly owned or wholly franchised will 
prevail and dominate. Explanations based on resources constraint, either capital, 
managerial talent, or local market information, predict that as the chains become mature, 
the percentage of company owned outlets should increase (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1969; 
Caves and Murphy 1976; Norton, 1988). On the contrary, signaling theory gives an 
opposite prediction (Gallini and Lutz 1992; Lafontaine, 1993). In reality, however, we 
often observe a relatively stable distribution of franchise and company-owned outlets 
within one network (Lafontaine and Shaw, 2005). 
Horizontal as well as vertical externalities exist in franchising networks 
(Willianson, 1981; Dnes, 1993; Dnes and Garoupa, 2005). These externalities can be also 
negative or positive. The most prominent example of a negative externality is free-riding 
in franchises. Free-riding originates from opportunistically using the common brand 
name by the various franchisees (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Rubin, 1978; Klein, 1980). 
For example, on one hand a franchisee may horizontally free ride upon other franchisees’ 
efforts (Rubin, 1978), and on the other hand she may vertically free ride upon the 
franchisor’s system-wide promotional efforts as well (Mathewson and Winter, 1985). 
There are also positive externalities, like organizational learning and innovation (Bradach, 
1997 and 1998; Sorenson and Sorensen, 2001; Lewin-Solomon, 1999; Cliquet and 
Nguyen, 2004). 
These externalities depend on the choice of single or plural form franchising. 
Bradach (1998) examines complementarities between the company-owned and franchised 
units. He argues that plural form may help franchise networks to overcome four strategic 
challenges: (1) growth; adding new franchised units may help franchisors to overcome 
growth constrains, (2) uniformity; a ratcheting process is created in franchising chains, 
where company-owned units and franchised units set performance benchmarks for each 
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other, (3)local responsiveness, which is enhanced by the franchisee’s local response to 
local customers and the market-pressure processes, and (4) system-wide adaptation to 
change; it is improved by the mutual learning process because plural form can generate 
more diverse ideas. Franchisees are influenced by the commitment and the results of 
company-owned units; and the company-owned units benefit from the challenge and post 
decision insights offered by the franchised units. So, the plural form may be superior to 
the single form because it leverages the strengths and ameliorate the weaknesses of each 
single form in order to maintain quality and homogeneity of the business concept 
throughout the entire franchise, while promoting innovation at the same time. 
Sorenson and Sorensen (2001) explain plural form in franchising from the 
perspective of exploration and exploitation paradox. Franchisees have more incentives to 
“exploration” and company managers are more possible to be “exploitation”. In the 
context of franchising, ‘exploration’ refers to the capabilities of innovation and local 
market knowledge learning, while ‘exploitation’ refers to the capabilities of controlling 
quality and executing administrative exercises. The mix of company-owned units and 
franchised units can affect the balance between centralization and standardization through 
organizational learning, thereby enhancing the franchise chain’s efficiency and 
performance.  
There are also literatures arguing that a plural form franchise has an advantage 
over a single form arrangement regarding innovation. Lewin-Solomon (1999) argues that 
franchisors keep a proportion of company-owned units as a commitment device in order 
to   give franchisees enough incentives to innovate. As the interest of the franchisor is 
aligned with the franchisees’, the franchisor can testify the innovations’ profitability by 
testing them first in company-owned units, thereby persuading franchisees to implement 
it. Cliquet and Nguyen (2004) stress that plural form play an important role in the three 
stages of innovation process, such as innovation generation, innovation testing and 
innovation implementation. They argue that franchisees are quite important in generating 
new ideas because they are closer to local markets and have higher incentives to improve 
performance than the company managers. On the other hand, company-owned units are 
considered to important in testing and implementing the innovations. 
This article addresses dual distribution in franchising from a governance 
perspective. Governance concerns the organization of transactions, whereas a governance 
structure consists of a collection of rules structuring the transactions between the various 
stakeholders. Franchising is an example of a governance structure. It is a vertical 
relationship between parties in two stages of a production chain. Other examples of 
governance structures are investor owned enterprises, worker-controlled firms, 
cooperatives, mutuals, joint ventures, networks, foundations, and public enterprises. 
A standard way of delineating a governance structure is to distinguish income and 
decision rights (Hansmann, 1996).2 Income rights address the question ‘How are benefits 
and costs allocated?’, i.e. they specify the rights to receive the benefits, and obligations to 
pay the costs, that are associated with the use of an asset. For example, a franchise has to 
choose the level of the royalty rate and the franchise fee. Other important themes 
regarding income rights are financing, cost allocation schemes, and the effects of 
horizontal as well as vertical competition. 
                                                 
2 Saloner e.a. (2001) uses the distinction incentives and authority. 
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Decision rights in the form of authority and responsibility address the question 
‘Who has authority or control?’, i.e. they concern all rights and rules regarding the 
deployment and use of assets. Governance is relevant next to (formal) contracts because 
contracts are in general incomplete, due to the complexity of the transaction or the 
vagueness of language.3  Contractual incompleteness is dealt with by (the choice of) 
organization because it allocates authority to somebody to decide in circumstances not 
covered by the contract. Important themes regarding authority are its allocation (‘make-
or-buy’ decision), formal versus real authority, relational contracts, access, decision 
control (ratification, monitoring), decision management (initiation, implementation), task 
design, conflict resolution, and enforcement mechanisms. 
The focus in this article is on the allocation of decision rights in franchises. There 
are system-specific assets, like the brand name, and decisions have to be taken regarding 
the network’s production, marketing, and service in order to improve its brand name 
value and maintain system-wide standardization. There are also local-specific assets, like 
knowledge about the local market, and decisions have to be taken regarding local 
operations. Plural form franchising is special because there are two decision rights 
regimes within one organization, i.e. local managers as employees of company-owned 
outlets and managers as employers/entrepreneurs of independent outlets, as well as 
different income rights for these two classes of franchisees. 
Transaction cost economics argues that the costs differences that are measured by 
asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty may explain the different ownership structure 
of the individual units. Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach (1991), Gallini and Lutz (1992), 
Mathewson and Winter (1994) and Lutz (1995) point out the importance of ownership in 
determining the incentives under different structures. Primarily the influence of 
transaction specificity on the tendency toward vertical integration by company-owned 
units was investigated. The risk of opportunism by the franchisor is reduced by the 
franchisee’s outlet-specific investments; as a result, the percentage of company-owned 
units decreases. 
According to the property rights theory, the allocation of residual income rights 
depends on the importance of intangible system-specific and local market assets. The 
percentage of company-owned outlets (PCO) is expected to be higher when franchisor’s 
intangible assets are more important than franchisee’s intangible assets for generating 
residual income, because more property rights should be transferred to franchisor. 
Therefore, PCO is positively related to the intangible system-specific assets and 
negatively related to the intangible local market assets. Ownership redirection cannot be 
accomplished because of the non-contractibility of both franchisor and franchisee’s 
intangible assets, and consequently leads to a stable dual distribution of company-owned 
and franchised outlets (Windsperger, 2004). Franchising increases franchisors’ and 
franchisees’ ex ante incentives; and at the same time it also creates ex post incentive 
conflicts between them. Under a dual ownership structure, the allocation pattern of 
decision rights may alleviate the incentive conflicts. For example, franchisee receives 
higher investment incentive from a low royalty, which weakens franchisor’s incentive. 
                                                 
3 Contracts are usually distinguished between complete and incomplete contracts (Hart, 1995). Complete 
contracts specify all relevant aspects of an exchange, whereas an incomplete contract assigns authority to 
somebody to decide in circumstances not covered by the formal contract. 
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Franchisor may compensate this disincentive effects through keeping a proportion of 
company-owned outlets (Windsperger and Yurdakul, 2005). 
In this article, an incomplete contracting model of dual distribution in franchising 
is presented along the lines of Hart and Moore (1990). Three parties are distinguished: 
the franchisor with investment opportunity of value A, a franchisee with investment 
opportunity of value B and a franchisee with investment opportunity of value C (>B). A 
parameter σ captures an externality being specific to the plural form. Complete 
franchising is the unique, efficient governance structure only when the plural form 
externality is limited and the costs of investment are low for both franchisees. 
Governance structure choice is irrelevant when the costs of investment are high for all 
franchisees, because no franchisee will invest. Finally, a plural form governance structure 
is the unique, efficient equilibrium in all other cases because the power allocated to 
independent franchisees makes them confident that they will be able to recoup their 
investments. Not locational or other differences between units are necessary for the 
emergence of plural form franchising, but positive externalities being specific for the 
plural form. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3, the 
incentive to invest is determined for each party in each governance structure. Section 4 
addresses the choice of governance structure. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model 
 
The choice of governance structure and the incentive to invest is analyzed from an 
incomplete contracting perspective. The incomplete contracting perspective argues that a 
distinction has to be made between observable and verifiable actions, i.e. not all 
observable actions are also verifiable by a third party (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Only 
verifiable actions can be included in a meaningful contract. The classic incomplete 
contracting model of Hart and Moore (1990) consists of a non-cooperative game of two 
stages: a governance structure stage and an investment stage. The choice of governance 
structure determines the bargaining strength of each party in the first stage, while 
bargaining positions are determined by the choice of the level of investment in the second 
stage. The relationship between the first and the second stage is that the allocation of 
bargaining power by the choice of governance structure in the first stage determines the 
incentive to invest in the second stage. 
We consider the choice of franchising or company ownership in a two-store chain. 
Three parties are distinguished: a franchisor choosing to produce a brand / trademark of 
value A, a seller deciding to add value B to the product / service of the franchisor, and a 
seller deciding to add value C (>B) to the product / service of the franchisor. Figure 1 
presents these three parties. The top box is the franchisor, while the bottom-left (right) 
box is seller B(C). 
 
 
       
 
 
 
Franchisor
FranchiseesB C
A
Figure 1: The three parties 
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The focus is on the ownership of the local units and the trademark. Figure 2 
distinguishes four governance structures. Governance structure I entails that all outlets 
are company owned. There are two plural form governance structures. The high value 
franchisee is independent in governance structure II, while the low value franchisee is 
independent in governance structure III. All franchisees are independent in governance 
structure IV. A cross in a box indicates that this party has the residual control / power / 
authority to decide in unforeseen circumstances (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1990). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Wholly company owned 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. Plural form with low value manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Plural form with high value manager 
 
 
IV. Wholly franchised 
 
Figure 2: Four governance structures 
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It is assumed that both parties sell one unit of the product. They decide only about 
adding additional value to the product. A parameter σ is introduced to capture positive 
externalities being specific to the plural form as described by Bradach (1997), like system 
wide learning (σ > 1) and competition / ratcheting / benchmarking (σ > 1). (The case σ < 
1 will also be analyzed, i.e. negative externalities being specific to the plural form.) 
Define x1 (x2, x3) as the sunk costs by the franchisor (franchisee B, franchisee C), where 
xi is either 0 or 1. Table 1 summarizes these ingredients of the model by presenting the 
characteristic function form when all parties invest for all governance structures (G). 
 
x (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) (1,1,1) 
G I II III IV 
v(1) A+B+C A+σB A+σC A 
v(2) 0 0 σB B 
v(3) 0 σC 0 C 
v(12) A+B+C A+σB A+σB+σC A+B 
v(13) A+B+C A+σB+σC A+σC A+C 
v(23) 0 σC σB B+C 
v(123) A+B+C A+σB+σC A+σB+σC A+B+C 
 
Table 1: Characteristic function form when all parties invest 
 
3. Investment 
 
This section consists of two parts. Section 3.1 determines the payoff for each player 
in every governance structure when all parties invest. Section 3.2 presents the subgame 
perfect equilibrium investment choices. 
 
3.1 Investment incentives 
 
The characteristic functions of the previous section determine the incentive to invest. 
We use, like Hart and Moore (1990), the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) in order to 
determine the value of each player in each governance structure for all combinations of 
investment decisions. These values / payoffs reflect the distribution of bargaining power. 
The economic interpretation of the Shapley value is that it provides a measure for the 
incentive intensity to invest. Table 2 presents the Shapley values belonging to the 
characteristic functions of table 1. 
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x G Shapley value franchisor Shapley value seller B Shapley value seller C
(1,1,1) I A+B+C 0 0 
(1,1,1) II A+σB 0 σC 
(1,1,1) III A+σC σB 0 
(1,1,1) IV A B C 
 
Table 2: Shapley values when all parties invest 
 
3.2 Investment choices 
 
The above results are incomplete regarding the choices that will be made by the 
various parties. The reason is that the investment decisions are exogenous. The costs of 
investment have to be taken into account in order to determine the investment decisions. 
Define k1 (k2, k3) as the sunk costs by the franchisor (buyer B, buyer C). All payoffs in 
the game are now specified. Appendix 1 depicts the extensive form of the game. The 
subgame perfect equilibrium investment decisions are determined by the method of 
backward induction. These decisions and the associated payoffs are presented in figure 3 
(when k1 ≤ A and σ>1).45 
 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
III: (A-k1, σB-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
III: (A-k1, σB-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
III: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, σC-k3) 
III: (A-k1, σB-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, σC-k3) 
III: (A-k1, σB-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, σC-k3) 
III: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, σC-k3) 
III: (A-k1, σB-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, B-k2, C-k3) 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, σC-k3) 
III: (A-k1, σB-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, C-k3) 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, σC-k3) 
III: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, 0, C-k3) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The case k1 > A is presented by replacing the payoff A-k1 of the franchisor by 0 in all governance 
structures in figure 3. 
5 The case σ < 1 is presented in appendix 2. 
k2 
σC 
C 
B σB 
k3 
Figure 3: Subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs when k1 ≤ A and σ>1 
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4. Efficient governance structure 
 
This section formulates results regarding the efficient governance structure choice 
in the first stage of the game. Efficiency of a governance structure entails that the sum of 
the payoffs of the three players in this governance structure is at least as high as the sum 
of the payoffs of the three players in any other governance structure. We limit ourselves 
to the case k1 ≤ A and σ>1. 
The efficient governance structure choice, and its feasibility, is determined by 
figure 3. All governance structures are efficient in the north-east rectangle, i.e. they all 
result in a surplus of A-k1. The franchisor is the only party investing in specific assets 
because its costs of investment are sufficiently low. Governance structure III is the 
unique efficient governance structure in the north-west and north rectangle (because σB-
k2 > B-k2 > 0). The franchisor invests again in every governance structure. Franchisee C 
never invests when k3 > σC because the costs of investment are too high. This is efficient. 
Franchisee B does not invest in the governance structures I and II because there is no 
incentive to invest due to the lack of power. These governance structures are inefficient 
because the value generated by franchisee B is larger than its costs. However, franchisee 
B invests in the governance structures III and IV because sufficient power is allocated to 
this franchisee. Governance structure III is the unique efficient governance structure 
because it generates the dual distribution externality, whereas governance structure IV 
does not. A similar reasoning applies to governance structure II being uniquely efficient 
in the east and south-east rectangle. 
Governance structure I is never efficient in the remaining four rectangles, while 
governance structure IV is only efficient for certain parameter values in the south-east 
rectangle. Governance structure IV is efficient when σB-k2 < B-k2+C-k3 and σC-k3 < B-
k2+C-k3, i.e. k3 < C-(σ-1)B and k2 < B-(σ-1)C. Figure 4 presents the situation where B-
(σ-1)C < 0, i.e. there are substantial positive dual distribution externalities.6 There are no 
parameter values for which governance structure IV is the unique efficient governance 
structure. The intermediate investment incentives for both franchisees in governance 
structure IV are not strong enough to override the strong investment incentives for either 
franchisee B in governance structure III or franchisee C in governance structure II. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The upward sloping line in the figures 2 and 3 is characterized by k3=σ(C-B)+k2. 
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Governance structure II is the unique efficient governance structure in the south-
east. It discourages efficiently investment by franchisee B with its relatively high costs of 
investment, while franchisee C invests and generates the dual distribution externality. 
The reverse holds in the north-west. Governance structure III is efficient because 
discourages investment by franchisee C with its relatively high costs of investment, while 
franchisee C invests and generates the dual distribution externality. 
Figure 5 presents the efficient governance structure choices when B-(σ-1)C > 0. 
The intermediate investment incentives for both franchisees in governance structure IV 
create more value than the strong investment incentive for either franchisee B in 
governance structure III or franchisee C in governance structure II when the plural form 
externality is limited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Efficient governance structures when σ ≥ 1+B/C 
k3 
k2 
II 
I-IV 
III σC 
 σ(C – B) 
σB 
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The above results will now be summarized in a number of results. 
 
Result 1: Governance structure I is never a unique efficient governance structure. 
 
Explanation: The franchisees have no power in governance structure I, and therefore no 
incentive to invest. Governance structure I is only as efficient as the other governance 
structures when the costs of investment discourage investment by all franchisees in all 
governance structures.  
 
Result 2: Governance structure II is the unique efficient governance structure choice 
when σ > 1, k2 is above a certain level, and k3 is below a certain level. 
 
Explanation: Franchisee B will not invest because its costs of investment are too high, 
regardless whether it has power or not. The costs of investment of franchisee C are low, 
but some power is needed in order to cover these costs. Governance structures III and IV 
remain. Governance structure III strictly dominates governance structure IV when there 
are positive plural form externalities, i.e. σ > 1. 
 
IV 
Figure 5: Efficient governance structures when 1 < σ < 1+B/C 
k3 
k2 
II 
I-IV 
III σC 
C-(σ-1)B 
B-(σ-1)C σB 
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Result 3: Governance structure III is the unique efficient governance structure choice 
when σ > 1, k2 is below a certain level and k3 is above a certain level. 
 
Explanation: Similar to the explanation of result 2. 
 
Result 4: Governance structure IV is the unique efficient governance structure choice 
when k2 and k3 are small and σ < 1+B/C. 
 
Explanation: The attractiveness of governance structure IV is that both franchisees have 
an incentive to invest because each of them has power. However, the positive plural form 
externality is not captured. Governance structures II and III have the advantage of 
generating the positive plural form externality, but only the independent franchisee 
invests. The value of having both franchisees investing dominates the generation of the 
plural form externality by one investing franchisee when plural form externality is not too 
high. 
 
Result 5: Governance structure IV is never a unique efficient governance structure choice 
when σ > 1+B/C. 
 
Explanation: The reverse of the explanation of result 4. 
 
Result 6: Plural form franchising, i.e. either governance structures II or III, is the unique 
efficient governance structure for the parameter values specified in the results 2 and 3, 
even when B = C. 
 
Explanation: This result covers special cases of the results 2, 3 and 5. The value 
generated by the independent franchisee in a plural form governance structure is higher 
than the value generated by either one or two franchisees in governance structure IV. 
This result shows that it is not necessary for the emergence of the plural form that there 
are locational differences, or other differences between the franchisees. System wide 
externalities are responsible for the plural form being a unique, efficient governance 
structure. 
 
Result 7: If σ=1, then governance structure IV is efficient for all values of the parameters 
k2 and k3.  
 
Explanation: Figure 6 illustrates the result. Governance structure IV is always efficient 
because the incentive to invest for each franchisee in governance structure IV is always at 
least as strong as in the governance structures I-III. This result indicates that the positive 
plural form externality is crucial for a plural form governance structure to be a unique, 
efficient governance structure. 
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III, IV I-IV 
IV II, IV 
 
 
Figure 6: Efficient governance structure choice when σ = 1 
 
5.  Conclusions and further research 
 
Lutz (1995, 129) stated: ‘A multiple unit model can determine whether locational 
differences are necessary for dual distribution, or whether dual distribution can arise as a 
solution for incentive problems even when all units are ex ante identical. The most 
important extension will be to examine the choice of ownership for individual units 
within a multiple-unit chain. Since we observe franchise relationships almost exclusively 
in these chains, this extension is crucial for developing empirical predictions’. We have 
presented a multiple unit model with the plural form being a unique, efficient governance 
structure. Not locational or other differences between units are necessary for the 
emergence of plural form franchising, but positive externalities being specific for the 
plural form. 
Our model is too simple to capture the richness of franchising practices. For 
example, Lutz (1995, 129) continued: ‘Such a multiple-unit model should have several 
key features. First, at least some of the central firm’s effort creates a public good: 
improvements in the trademark will increase profits at all stores in the chain. Second, any 
local manager’s action may also affect the profits at other units: this will be the case 
when a local manager’s action affects the value of the trademark. Thus incentives for all 
parties are interdependent.’ These two features are not incorporated is the current model. 
However, these and other several extensions are possible. 
First, notice that the parameter σ depends in the current model on governance 
structure, but in rudimentary way because σ(G)= σ when G=II, III or σ(G)= 1 when G=I, 
IV. There are various possibilities to model the parameter σ as the outcome of an 
equilibrium process, where σ is either smaller, or equal, or larger than one, like the 
modeling of ‘ratcheting’ by the literature regarding relative compensation (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981 and Green and Stokey, 1983), or complementarities along the lines of 
Bradach (1997) by the systems of attributes literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991 
and 1994). This extension entails that an additional stage is added between the current 
C 
B 
k3 
k2 
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two stages of the game. Second, the percentage of company owned outlets can be only 
one of three levels in our model in the various governance structures, i.e. 0% (IV), 50% 
(II, III), or 100% (I). Incorporating more sellers will allow for more variability regarding 
the percentage of company owned outlets. 
Third, the focus has been on the allocation of decision rights. However, many 
authors refer to the monitoring and free riding problems in franchising. The relationship 
between these income rights aspects of franchising and the plural form has to be 
determined. A similar observation holds regarding the use of royalty rates. Fourth, the 
extent of incompleteness is not endogenous. A franchise has to decide how much 
discretion is assigned to the activities of the franchisees. The standard way of dealing 
with this issue in franchises is the choice of the business format. Given the business 
format content in our model and making it endogenous along the lines of Tadelis (2002) 
is a challenging line of research. The extent of coverage of the business format may turn 
out to vary with the choice of governance structure. 
Fifth, Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) highlight the importance of the trademark in 
dual distribution franchises. Their empirical evidence indicates that there is a strong 
tendency that the number of company-owned outlet increases when the value of the 
brand/trademark (A) increases. The comparative statics results in the current model are 
independent of the value (A) of the brand. However, if other governance structures are 
also taken into consideration, e.g. mirror images regarding authority of governance 
structures I-III in figure 2, then our model may be able to account for this relationship 
between the value of the brand and governance structure choice. This will be a topic for 
future research. 
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Appendix 1: Extensive form 
 
The first stage of the game consists of the choice of governance structure. There are 
four possible choices. The second stage of the game consists of the investment decisions 
of the three players. Each player decides between investing or not investing in specific 
assets. The sequence of their decisions does not matter in our specification of the payoffs. 
We depict the choice of the franchisor first, subsequently the choice of franchisee B, and 
finally the choice of franchisee C. The total number of choice sequences is therefore 
4x2x2x2=32. The extensive form is presented in the figures 7-10 due to this large number 
of possible decision sequences. The payoffs are based on table 2. The payoffs below 
branch YYY are composed of revenues and costs. The revenues are taken straight from 
table 2, while each player carries it costs of specific investments. Similarly, branch NYN 
corresponds to investment vector (0, 1, 0), i.e. only franchisee B invests. Benefit B is 
generated and taken by the franchisor, while franchisee B carries the costs k2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y  
Y N
         Investment choiceY N
Y N N
Y N Y N 
A+B+C-k1      A+B-k1  A+C-k1          A-k1      B+C                  B        C                  0        Payoff franchisor 
       -k2                  -k2        0                  0            -k2               -k2       0                  0   Payoff franchisee B 
       -k3                   0         -k3                0            -k3                0        -k3                0    Payoff franchisee C 
Franchisee B 
Franchisee C 
 Investment choice
Investment choice
Figure 7: Extensive form when governance structure I has been chosen 
Y N
Franchisor 
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N N
   A+σC-k1        A-k1   A+σC-k1      A-k1       σC                  0       σC                   0 Payoff Franchisor 
      σB-k2         σB-k2      0                 0         σB-k2            σB-k2    0                    0 Payoff franchisee B 
        -k3                 0         -k3                0           -k3                   0        -k3                  0          Payoff franchisee C 
         Investment choiceY N
Franchisee B
Franchisee C
 Investment choice
Investment choice
Y Y
Y N Y N Y N Y N
Figure 9: Extensive form when governance structure III has been chosen  
   A+σB-k1     A+σB-k1  A-k1          A-k1          σB                σB      0                   0             Payoff franchisor 
      -k2                  -k2             0                  0            -k2                 -k2       0                   0  Payoff franchisee B 
     σC-k3                0      σC-k3           0            σC-k3            0      σC-k3            0         Payoff franchisee C 
         Investment choiceY N
Y N Y N
Y N Y N Y N Y N
Franchisee B 
Franchisee C 
 Investment choice
Investment choice
Figure 8: Extensive form when governance structure II has been chosen 
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N N
Y N
Franchisee B
Franchisee C
 Investment choice
Investment choice
       A-k1             A-k1    A-k1             A-k1        0                    0        0                    0         Payoff Franchisor 
       B-k2              B-k2          0                  0         B-k2               B-k2     0                    0 Payoff franchisee B 
       C-k3                0        C-k3               0         C-k3                 0       C-k3                0 Payoff franchisee C 
 
          Investment choice
Y Y
Y N Y N Y N Y N
Figure 10: Extensive form when governance structure IV has been chosen 
Franchisor 
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Appendix 2: Subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs when σ<1  
 
 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
III: (A-k1, σB-k2, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
III: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
IV: (A-k1, B-k2, 0) 
 
I: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
II: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
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IV: (A-k1, 0, 0) 
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Figure 11: Subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs when k1 ≤ A, σ<1 
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